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Abstract 
The distribution of well-being in society and comparisons of well-being across societies depend 
both on the amount of inequality at the national level and also on the national average level of 
well-being. Comparisons between the U.S. and western Europe show that inequality is greater in 
the U.S. but that average GDP/capita is also greater in the U.S., and most Americans have higher 
standards of living than do Western Europeans at comparable locations in their national income 
distributions.  What is less well-known is that (depending on the country) much or all of this gap 
arises from differences in the level of working hours in the U.S. and in Western Europe.  Cross-
national comparisons of well-being have typically relied on the methodology of generalized 
Lorenz curves (GLC), but this approach privileges disposable income and cash transfers while ig-
noring other aspects of welfare state and labor market structure that potentially affect the distri-
bution of well-being in a society.  We take an alternative approach that focuses on the value of 
time use and the different distributions of work and family time that are generated by each coun-
try’s labor market and social welfare institutions. We show that reasonable estimates of the 
greater contribution to well-being from non-market activities such as the raising of children or 
longer vacations overturn claims in the literature that the U.S. offers greater well-being to more of 
its citizens than do Western European countries. 
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 Well-being in more and less egalitarian countries 
 
Are people better off in a country that is more egalitarian or in one that is less egalitarian? This 
question, which has been debated for centuries, has no easy answer. Some scholars argue that 
inequality arises naturally from economic activity and that constraints on the production of in-
equality are by their nature government-induced constraints on individual freedom. From this 
perspective, they have argued that equality limits freedom and thus is inferior on moral 
grounds to inequality. Others observe that inequality can also limit the freedom of action of the 
relatively poor, both because those from disadvantaged backgrounds are handicapped in their 
efforts to compete for material rewards in the marketplace and because the rich are able to use 
money to gain disproportionate influence on outcomes in the political process.  
 
A second major issue concerns how inequality affects material standard of living. As 
many scholars have noted, increases in inequality with fixed aggregate income or wealth make 
many people worse off in order that a few people are better off. If everyone has equal moral 
worth, and if there are diminishing returns to wealth, then it is easy to show that society is 
worse off under such transfers. However, others argue that inequality promotes growth by in-
creasing the incentives for productive economic activity. If true, the increase in aggregate in-
come can in theory make people who are lower in the income distribution better off than they 
would be if incomes were spread more equally. 
 
In practice, the comparison between more equal and less equal societies is made difficult 
by the complex way that income is earned and redistributed in modern societies. The welfare 
state provides in-kind services as well as monetary transfers. To some extent, these transfers re-
distribute income from high earners to low earners, but they also smooth income for the same 
individual over his or her life course. The welfare state also affects the distribution of income 
through its regulation of the labor market, and labor unions also affect distribution by nego-
tiating the provision of non-monetary and monetary benefits for their members. The complexity 
of the bundle of income and services makes it difficult to establish the precise distribution of so-
cial welfare within even one society, let alone the extent to which aggregate welfare differs be-
tween societies. 
 
The difficulty of obtaining a comprehensive comparison of social welfare across coun-
tries calls instead for efforts to evaluate major components of societal difference in order to 
evaluate their potential importance in the overall societal comparison. Garfinkel, Rainwater and 
Smeeding (2005), for example, recently made an effort to evaluate the impact of education and 
health benefits on the distribution of wellbeing across a set of industrialized countries. They 
found that the inclusion of these benefits substantially narrows differences in inequality be-
tween the U.S. and a set of Western European countries because the U.S. spends such a large 
amount of its GDP on education and especially on health care than do European societies, in-
cluding on those lower in the income distribution. However, the conclusion they reached is sen-
sitive both to assumptions about the distribution of these benefits, and also (and perhaps more 
critically) on their assumption about whether Americans (and particularly lower-income Ameri-
cans) get as much health and education per dollar of expenditure as do Europeans. Other schol-
ars (Rainwater and Smeeding 1997) have demonstrated the impact of a nation’s demographic 
structure on cross-national differences in inequality. 
    
In this paper, we address a different component of cross-national differences. Aside 
from the structure of taxes and social welfare benefits, perhaps the most obvious difference be-
tween countries commonly called liberal social welfare states and the social democratic and 
conservative welfare states concerns working hours. There is a large difference in the average 
working hours in the United States and in many parts of Western Europe. While Western Euro-
peans once worked more than Americans, they steadily reduced their hours of work through-
out the 1970s and 1980s to the point where they now work substantially fewer hours than do 
Americans. There are four major components to this difference. The first concerns the retire-
ment age; Western Europeans have retired at earlier ages than Americans since the 1980s. The 
second concerns unemployment. Unemployment rates in many Western European societies 
were much lower than American rates in the 1960s, but they climbed above U.S. levels by the 
1980s or early 1990s, and are often targeted as a societal “cost” of lower inequality in Europe. A 
third component is the shorter number of weeks worked per year (including paid vacation 
weeks) and hours worked per week by the typical working-age adult in Europe. These differ-
ences are partly linked to the successful efforts of European unions to reduce the definition of 
full-time work relative to the U.S., and also stem from the greater accommodation that many 
European societies have made to the dual demands of work and family via maternity leave and 
the availability of part-time work for working mothers. The fourth component concerns vaca-
tion time, with paid vacations typically much longer in Western European societies than in the 
United States. 
 
Taken together, these components comprise a striking difference between the typical 
hours of work per capita or per worker in the United States and the typical Western European 
society. Table 1 displays statistics from the OECD Employment Outlook about work hours per 
capita and work hours per worker. Per capita working hours in the Netherlands, France and 
Germany – to take only a few examples - are less than 80 percent of the American level. The 
source of this discrepancy is partly due to a higher employment to population ratio in the U.S. 
than in most European countries, but the average worker in the U.S. also works more hours 
than does his or her European counterpart. The average French job has only 90 percent of the 
hours of the average American job, while the average Dutch job has only 80 percent of the hours 
of the average American job.  
 
Relative to the differences in work hours, differences in productivity in the U.S. and 
Western Europe are much smaller, as can be seen in the GDP per hour worked data from Table 
1. These data show that several European countries including the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Norway and Ireland all had higher GDP per hour worked than did the U.S. However, the GDP per 
capita was 18 percent lower in the Netherlands than in the U.S. in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
adjusted currency, 22 percent lower in Belgium, and 28 percent lower in France. A similar pat-
tern applies to other western European countries. The German GDP per working hour was 91 
percent of the U.S., but the GDP per capita is 29 percent lower than in the U.S., while in Sweden 
the 11 percent gap in GDP per working hour grows to a 22 percent gap in GDP per capita. Table 1: Hours worked per worker, hours worked per capita, GDP per capita, and GDP per hour worked  
for the United States and selected Western European countries (2005)  
 
  Hours worked 
per worker 
Hours worked per capita  GDP per hour worker ($ U.S.)  GDP per capita ($ U.S.) 
  total  as % of 
U.S. 
gap in % 
points 
total  as % of 
U.S. 
gap in % 
points 
total  as % of 
U.S. 
gap in % 
points 
total  as % of 
U.S. 
gap in % 
points 
Austria 1656 91  -3  836  97 -3  40.1 83  -17  33 569  80  -20 
Belgium 1534  84  -29  616  71 -29  52.9 109  9  32 549  78  -22 
Denmark 1551  85  -8  796  92 -8  43.3 90  -10  34 445  82  -18 
Finland 1714 94  -9  783  91 -9  40.1 83  -17  31 389  75  -25 
France* 1546 85  -29  617  71 -29  49.0 101  1  30 245  72  -28 
Germany 1437  79  -22  677  78 -22  44.0 91  -9  29 758  71  -29 
Ireland 1638 90  -11  773  89 -11  50.5 104  4  39 034  93  -7 
Italy 1801  99  -14  747  86 -14  38.1 79  -21  28 471  68  -32 
Luxembourg 1557  85  21  1051  121 21  64.7 134  34  67 976  163  63 
Netherlands 1367  75  -20  688  80 -20  50.1 104  4  34 457  82  -18 
Norway 1360  75  -21  680  79 -21  63.5 131  31  43 164  103  3 
Portugal 1685  92  -5  824  95 -5  24.1 50  -50  19 879  48  -52 
Spain 1669  92 -15  739  85 -15  36.9 76  -24  27 284  65  -35 
Sweden 1587  87  -12  761  88 -12  43.0 89  -11  32 683  78  -22 
Switzerland 1659  91  7  925  107 7  39.0 81  -19  36 058  86  -14 
United 
Kingdom 
1669 92  -7  801  93 -7  40.1 83  -17  32 151  77  -23 
United 
States 
1824 100  0  865  100 0  48.3 100  0  41 789  100  0 
*Includes overseas departments. 
Source: OECD Compendium of Labor Productivity, 2006. 
Statistics for Austria are hours worked per job. 
Statistics for the U.S. and the UK are 2004 data taken from the OECD Employment Outlook, 2005. Statistical Annex Table F.
   Whether someone would prefer to live in a European welfare state or a liberal market-
oriented society certainly depends in large part on where the person is located in the skills and 
earnings distributions. Someone with poor job opportunities would probably prefer a welfare 
state where his income is raised by security benefits. A very successful worker, on the other 
hand, might prefer a liberal welfare state where taxes are lower and earnings are high at the top 
of the distribution. But which country would a randomly chosen risk-neutral individual typi-
cally choose? The most plausible answer is that he would choose the country where he was more 
likely to be better off. Generalized Lorenz curves provide a way of operationalizing this calcu-
lation. If the populations of two countries are ranked on the same metric, the cross-over point in-
dicates the percentile-ranges that are better off in each country. The location of the cross-over 
point depends both upon the shape of the two distributions and on differences in the average in-
come. At one extreme, where average incomes are the same but where the top earning person 
earned almost all the income in the less egalitarian country, then 99.99+ percent of the popula-
tion in the more equal country would be better off than their counterparts (in percentile terms) 
in the less equal country. It would also be possible for average incomes to be the same but for 
the majority of the population in a more unequal country to be better off than their counterparts 
in a more equal country.1 Generalized Lorenz curves also demonstrate the potentially critical 
importance of aggregate income in determining the relative standing of two populations. A 
large majority of the population in a high-inequality country may be better off than their 
counterparts in a more egalitarian country solely because the aggregate per-capita income in the 
inegalitarian country is significantly greater than in the egalitarian country.  
                                                
 
The large difference in hours worked between the U.S. and several of the Western Euro-
pean welfare states creates just this situation. Figure 1 shows generalized Lorenz curves for the 
U.S., France, Belgium and the Netherlands, where the cumulative shares of income in each of 
these countries is compared to total income in the U.S. after conversion to U.S. dollars based on 
PPP.2 Figure 2 then shows hypothetical generalized Lorenz curves that would be obtained if the 
incomes of France, Belgium and the Netherlands were scaled up so that the average working 
hours of these countries equaled the average working hours in the U.S.3 In the actual GLCs, the 
American distribution overtakes the Belgian and Dutch distributions at the thirtieth percentile. 
This implies that the bottom 30 percent of the population in the Netherlands and Belgium are 
better off than their counterparts in the U.S., but that most Americans are better off than most in-
habitants of either of these two European countries. The American distribution is actually higher 
than the French distribution at all quantiles. However, if the European distributions were scaled 
up to the point where average working hours were the same as in the U.S., the actual overtaking 
point for the U.S. would be at the sixtieth percentile for France, at the eightieth percentile for the 
Netherlands, and not until the ninety-fifth percentile for Belgium. Clearly, almost all the income 
advantage in the U.S. stems from the greater amount of work done by American workers rela-
tive to their European counterparts.  
 
 
1This situation could arise if the bottom deciles of the more unequal country lived in extreme poverty 
while everyone else enjoyed slightly higher incomes than their counterparts in the more equal country. 
2The data are from Gottschalk and Smeeding (1999), appendix table 1, and are taken from the Luxem-
bourg Income Surveys for the U.S. in 1991, Belgium in 1992, the Netherlands in 1991, and France in 1984. 
3The scaling is done under the simplifying assumption that the mean of the country distributions would 
be shifted up, but that the shape of the distributions would remain the same. 
 
  4 The European pattern of work hours stems partly from specific features of European so-
cial welfare and labor market institutions. More generous pension and unemployment benefits 
might lower the incentive to work (Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2003). Higher wages for low skill 
labor or higher employer taxes to pay for social benefits might lead to a reduced demand for 
labor and thus an overall reduction in average working hours in European countries (Berdasi 
and Gornick, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2002). Within the context of an approach such as that used by 
Garfinkel et al. (2005), the reduced hours becomes a cost of the welfare state through reduced ag-
gregate income, which may or may not be made up by the economic value of the unemployment 
compensation, pensions, or maternity benefits that are provided by the state or by employers. 
Some conservative commentators (such as David Brooks of the New York Times) have taken this 
reduction of working hours to be an indication that munificent social welfare states are not vi-
able in the long-term because of large reduction in aggregate income related to the lowered aver-
age work time. 
 
If the loss of income from the reduced working hours were the cost of heightened equal-
ity, it would appear that the price is very high. If instead, the people of Western Europe are gain-
ing a benefit to the reduction in work hours that offsets the income loss, then it becomes impor-
tant to incorporate this benefit in any systematic comparison between these countries and the 
United States. We demonstrate the importance of non-work hours through a comparison of the 
U.S. and the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
  5  
 
 
Non-working time and well-being 
 
Scholars do not all agree on the proper interpretation of the lower working hours in 
Western Europe. Some see the lower work hours as forced and therefore as representing a net 
loss in aggregate well-being. Prescott (2004), for example, recently argued that the work-hours 
difference is due to the tax systems of the U.S. and European countries, although his study im-
plies elasticities that are too high to be believable by many economists (Alesina, 2005). Others ar-
gue that the lower levels of work in Europe are forced on European workers by employers who 
lower labor demand in response to the high costs of labor regulation and of employer taxes that 
help pay the costs of the European welfare states (Berdasi and Gornick, 2000; Blau and Kahn 
2002). This conception does not apply to the Netherlands even though Dutch welfare state bene-
fits are generous. First, the unemployment rate in the Netherlands has been lower than that in 
the United States in every year since 1997, while the employment-to-population ratio in the two 
countries is very similar. Second, calculations on Dutch data (OSA Labour Supply Panel 2002, see 
Appendix A for results) show that only 6 percent of Dutch employees report that they would 
like to work more hours than they do at the moment; only one-third of this group think that they 
will not be able to realize their preference for more working hours within one year; and only 
about half of these “pessimists” mention demand-side factors as a reason for their expected in-
ability to work as many hours as they would like. In other words, only about 1 percent of em-
ployees in the Netherlands actually feel constrained due to demand-side factors.  
 
Other authors agree that non-working time has value and therefore offsets reductions in 
well-being from the forgone income: non-working time offers the opportunity to be with one’s 
children, to spend time on hobbies and to feel less stressed out (Osberg 2002a; Osberg 2002b). 
Blanchard (2004) argues that the higher work levels of Americans stem from the American pref-
erence for higher levels of consumption as opposed to higher levels of leisure. Alesina et al. 
(2005) show through a series of analyses that union and regulation variables can statistically ex-
plain the bulk of the difference in hours worked in the U.S. and Western Europe. They theorize 
  6 that the coordinated reduction in work and expansion of vacation expands the utility of leisure 
time and reinforces the desire in Europe for what Alesina et al. called “vacation en masse,” as 
evidenced by the fact that people who work fewer hours report higher levels of happiness in the 
Eurobarometer surveys. Meanwhile, Bianchi, Robinson and Milkie (2006) report in their trend 
analysis of time diaries that American mothers actually spend as much or more time with their 
children than do Dutch mothers both if they are employed and if they are not employed, while 
American fathers spend nearly as much time with children as do Dutch fathers. What suffers in 
the U.S., according to the data analyzed by Bianchi et al, is the amount of time spent with one’s 
spouse, time spent with friends, time for civic pursuits, sleep time, and leisure time, and this 
shortfall produces a heightened feeling of time strain among American working parents.  
 
The Dutch OSA data endorse the view that non-working time contributes to well-being. 
Table 2 shows that two-thirds of the part-time workers claim not to work full-time because they 
want to have enough time for household and caring tasks. Another 12 percent mention having 
enough time for hobbies as the reason. Reported health problems are a third reason given by 
Dutch adults for not working and not looking for a job. Taken together, these statistics give the 
impression that the Dutch assign positive value to the hours of non-work time that they gain by 
not being full-time workers. Our task is to incorporate this value into comparative studies of 
well-being. 
 
Table 2: Main Reasons Not to Work Full-Time 
  Total  I want to work 
same hours 
I want to work 
more hours 
I want to work 
fewer hours 
Dutch Part-Time Workers  N  %  N  %  N  %  N  % 
I want to have enough time for 
household and caring tasks 
583 64.6  452  66.7  50  51.5 81  63.3 
I want to have enough time for 
hobbies, etc. 
109 12.1  87  12.8  3  3.1 19  14.8 
I cannot work more hours with 
this employer 
50 5.5  23  3.4  22  22.7 5  3.9 
Education or courses  27  3.0  20  2.9  6  6.2 1  0.8 
Health problems  42  4.7  25  3.7  8  8.2 9  7.0 
I have a second job  13  1.4  10  1.5  1  1.0 2  1.6 
Other reason  70  7.8  55  8.1  6  6.2 9  7.0 
Don’t know  9  1.0  6  0.9  1  1.0 2  1.6 
TOTAL  903 100  678  100  97  100 128  100 
Source: OSA 2002 
 
Source: OSA 2002  Total  Men  Women 
Dutch adults who are out of the labor force  N  %  N  % N % 
Insufficient child care facilities  9  1.3     9  1.5 
My family situation does not allow me  99  14.6     99  16.5 
I have other significant tasks at home  243  35.8  6  7.4 237 39.6 
I have other significant tasks outside the home  23  3.4     23 3.9 
Early retirement  2  0.3  2  2.4    
Health problems  240  35.3  65  83.0 175 29.1 
There will be no job for me anyway  14  2.0     14 2.3 
Social security benefit is sufficient to live on  2  0.3     2  0.4 
Other reason  46  6.9  5  7.1 41 6.9 
TOTAL  678  100  78  100 600  100 
  7 Almost by definition, non-working time has at least the value of the earnings that one 
forgoes when the decision not to work is voluntary. Imagine, for example, a mother who at-
taches high value to raising her children herself and therefore chooses a part-time job even 
though it carries the loss of potential income.4 If we expressed well-being purely in terms of in-
come, we would conclude that her choice of fewer working hours and a corresponding reduc-
tion in household income would produce a net reduction in well-being. This interpretation, 
however, would clearly give an overly narrow and hence unrealistic picture of the situation. If a 
mother who has the choice to work full-time or part-time chooses to work part-time, she by defi-
nition values the added time that she spends with her family, child and friends at least as much 
as the income she forgoes by not working. She has accepted a lower income in exchange for a 
living situation that she values more than what she gives up. Because her time use is part of her 
well-being, the correct interpretation of a strictly voluntary choice is that her well-being is higher 
than it would be if she worked full time.5 
 
One objection to this interpretation might be that mothers make their decision about la-
bor supply in the context of their partner’s situation, and feel that a decision to work more hours 
would require a corresponding drop in their partner’s hours because of the high value they 
place on family care of the children. But this objection does not undermine the above interpre-
tation; it would still be true that women (and men) accept the drop in household income as an 
acceptable price for the opportunity to combine childcare with time for spouse, friends and other 
leisure activities. 
 
A second possible objection concerns the costs and availability of child care. If child care 
of a given quality was simply much more expensive in one country than in the other, then a 
greater net reduction of work hours in the first country might be a response to child care prices 
rather than a true difference in preferences. In this case, the higher cost of child care would pro-
duce a true reduction in well-being. 
 
With respect to the U.S. and the Netherlands, this objection appears to be unfounded. 
Available evidence (Immervoll and Barber 2005) suggests that the price structure for child care is 
not materially different in the two countries. The fees charged by child care centers in the Neth-
erlands are higher – 29 percent of an average production worker’s wages (APW) – than the 18 
percent in the U.S., but this difference in fees does not take into account rebates, child care bene-
fits and tax reductions, all of which affect the net cost of child care. The net out-of-pocket costs as 
a percent of the average production wage (APW) are lower for couples with two full-time in-
comes in the Netherlands than in the U.S. at household incomes equaling 200 percent of the 
APW, and the country-gap in favor of the Netherlands is even larger when family income is 
lower. Child care subsidies imply a higher implicit marginal tax on income and this must be 
taken into account to get an accurate comparison of well-being. However, as we show later in 
the paper, these implicit tax rates are not large enough to offset the argument that Dutch women 
gain net positive value from a voluntary reduction in work hours. 
                                                 
4We could instead frame the example as a joint choice of a woman and her partner, but the result is the 
same. 
5It would also be possible for someone incorrectly to anticipate the full consequences of her choice of time 
over income. In a context like that of the Netherlands, which is the empirical example of this paper, such 
mistakes can be corrected because labor demand is high, and therefore mobility between work and non-
work is relatively easy. 
 
  8 The failure to include the value of non-work time in calculations of national well-being 
amounts to treating the consumption of goods and the choice of non-work activities asymmetri-
cally, which does not make good theoretical sense. The fallacy can best be appreciated through a 
simple example concerning the utility gained from consumption of goods and services. Imagine 
that the populations of two countries have identical income distributions but differ strongly in 
their consumption preferences, with people in one country having a much stronger preference 
for cars than do people in the second country. If the income distributions in the two countries 
were recomputed using after-tax and also after-car-purchase income, it would appear that peo-
ple were on average worse off in the country with the higher preference for cars, and so a proper 
comparison should use pre-car purchase disposable income, which corresponds exactly to the 
logic of including the value of time in comparisons of well-being. With respect to the car exam-
ple, one could object to the inclusion of pre-car purchase income if the excess car purchases in 
the first country were not a voluntary choice, but rather were forced upon people by some ad-
verse condition in their environment, such as low-density communities or the denial of mass 
transit options in opposition to the preferences of the country’s population. If, for example, a de-
nial of mass transit were the only reason for the country difference in the rate of car purchases, it 
would in fact be more accurate to compute the distribution of well-being in the two countries on 
an after car-purchase/after mass-transit-cost basis. The issues raised by this hypothetical exam-
ple are identical to the issues raised by cross-national differences in the distribution of non-work 
time, and so in this paper we formally treat time in the same way we treat consumption in order 
to explore its potential importance for cross-national comparisons of living standards. 
 
The issues raised by cross-national differences in paid vacation time are in many respects 
similar to the issues raised by non-work time. However, there is relatively little variation in va-
cation time in the Netherlands, and so workers cannot as easily express an individual preference 
for longer vacations and less pay relative to shorter vacations and higher pay. The growth in the 
length of paid vacations in the Netherlands was the product of a series of agreements between 
Dutch labor unions and Dutch employers, and the content of these agreements then diffused to 
cover most of the Dutch work force (Alesina et al. 2005). The country differences therefore are 
not the direct consequence of individual preferences in the U.S. and the Netherlands. Another 
reason why the typical difference in paid vacation time does not imply differing individual 
tradeoffs between income and leisure is that the Dutch are typically paid for their longer vaca-
tions and holidays. Clearly, however, there must be a tradeoff; it is a standard result in labor 
economics that workers indirectly pay for a large share of non-wage benefits through lower 
hourly wages. In this paper we consider the impact of adjustments for cross-national differences 
in both hours of work and paid vacations and holidays on cross-national differences in the qual-
ity of life as implied by income statistics. 
 
As noted earlier, the U.S. and the Netherlands differ in their level of inequality and differ 
greatly in average working hours. The Netherlands has relatively low poverty and low inequal-
ity compared with the U.S., both because of its more equal distribution of market income and be-
cause of the redistributive impact of the Dutch welfare state (Rainwater and Smeeding 1997). 
Meanwhile, out of ten OECD countries studied by Jacobs and collaborators, the U.S. has the high-
est number of working hours and the Netherlands the lowest: 1976 versus 1368 annual hours for 
individuals or 72.3 versus 51.9 weekly hours for couples (Jacobs and Gornick 2001, Jacobs and 
Gerson 2004). An important reason for the low number of working hours in the Netherlands is 
the huge proportion of part-time working women: 58 percent of the employed women in the 
Netherlands works less than thirty hours a week, compared to 41 percent in the U.K., 34 percent 
  9 in Germany, 24 percent in France, 21 percent in Sweden and only 16 percent in U.S. (OECD 2000). 
In addition, the average number of paid vacation weeks varies from 3.9 in the United States to 
7.6 in the Netherlands. 
 
These differences in work time correspond to attitudinal differences between the Dutch 
and the Americans that show a much stronger family orientation in the Netherlands. Table 3 
shows that Dutch adults are much more likely than Americans to state that they will work hard 
only if it doesn’t interfere with their family life. In contrast, a majority of Americans report that 
they would give priority to work even if their family life suffered. These striking differences in 
attitudes and work behavior make the two cases of the U.S. and the Netherlands very suitable 
for evaluating how country differences in non-work time affect cross-national comparisons of 
well-being.  
 
Table 3: Differences in Work Ethics Between the United States and the Netherlands 
 
 U.S.  NL 
I only work as hard as I have to  8  7 
I work hard but only if it doesn’t interfere with family life  37  64 
I work as best I can even if this interferes with family life  55  29 
  100 100 
    
Proud of job and firm (scale score from 1 to 5)  3.5  2.6 
    
% strongly agree     
It is important in a job that income is high  80  58 
It is important in a job that it offers the opportunity to advance  89 79 
                          Source: General Social Survey 1998 (U.S.) and Cultural Changes 1997 (NL) 
 
Analytic Strategy 
 
 Our approach consists of three steps. First, we make a baseline comparison of the income 
distributions of the U.S. and the Netherlands for households where the head was between 
twenty-five and fifty-five years of age; this age range was chosen to exclude most retirement-
related behavior from our comparison. Second, we construct an adjustment measure for both 
countries that raises the income of satisfied part-timers – meaning those who work part-time in-
stead of full-time on a voluntary basis – to a full-time income, and we then measure the impact 
of this adjustment on cross-national comparisons of well-being. Finally, we construct a second 
adjustment measure that also takes the value of vacation time into account, and again we com-
pare the distribution of well-being in the two countries after accounting for the value of both 
types of non-work time. 
 
For the United States, we analyzed data from the 2000 March Current Population Survey, 
which is the survey that is incorporated in the Luxembourg Income Study (Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) Micro database 1999-2000). For the Netherlands, we made use of two datasets. The 
1999 data come from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), which is the Dutch contribution to 
the Luxembourg Income Study. We supplemented these data with 2000 data from the Family 
Survey Dutch Population (De Graaf, De Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 2000). The LIS/SEP consists 
of 2,717 households with positive incomes where the head was between twenty-five and fifty-
five years old, while the Family Survey Dutch Population contains information on 554 house-
  10 holds with these characteristics. Personal disposable household income was operationalized in 
the usual way as the sum of earned and unearned income plus government transfers and credits 
and minus taxes.6 In line with LIS recommendations and general practice, top and bottom coding 
have been applied, since people tend to underestimate very low incomes and overestimate very 
high incomes (Kenworthy 2004). Incomes lower than 1 percent of the mean are set to 1 percent of 
the mean income, and incomes over ten times the median are set to ten times the median in-
come.  
 
In order to make comparisons of income across countries, it is important to establish 
whether the micro-level measures of income are equally accurate across the countries. A stan-
dard approach for doing this is to compare the estimate of national income obtained by aggre-
gating the income reported in sample surveys with estimates obtained from national accounts 
data. We have done this for the American data and for the two surveys for the Netherlands. In 
the Dutch case, we compared the estimate of the population household disposable income esti-
mated from the two surveys with household net disposable income for 1999 and 2000 from the 
annual accounts by institutional sector that are reported by Statistics Netherlands. We found 
that the Family Survey Dutch Population accounted for 87.8 percent of the income reported in 
the national accounts, and that the Dutch LIS/SEP data accounted for 88.9 percent of the income 
reported by national accounts. For the American case, we relied on the recent report from Ruser, 
Pilot and Nelson (2004), who compared personal income reported in the national accounts data 
and in the 2002 March CPS. The population estimate of money income in the CPS was $6.446 tril-
lion, which compares with $8.678 trillion reported in the state personal income figures reported 
to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Most of this discrepancy consists of income received 
on behalf of individuals by pension plans, nonprofit institutions serving households, and fiduci-
aries. After adjusting for all differences in the types of income collected by these two methods, 
the authors identified an $804 billion shortfall in the CPS, which implies that the CPS accounted 
for 88.9 percent of the comparable income reported in the U.S. national accounts data, which is 
very similar to the figures obtained for the Netherlands. These calculations do not prove that the 
datasets are comparable because they do not measure the same thing (the Dutch calculation is 
after taxes, while the U.S. calculation is before taxes), and because the social welfare and tax sys-
tems are quite different in the two countries. Nonetheless, they do suggest at least rough compa-
rability in the data, which supports the utility of the analyses reported in this paper.  
 
In order to make the two Dutch surveys even more comparable with each other, we 
scaled them by the ratio of their fractions of national accounts income, but this standardization is 
so small as to be unnoticeable in the charts to follow. We then converted household income to 
                                                 
6CPS and LIS/SEP household income consists of earnings from wage and salary work, self-employment in-
come, farm income, unemployment compensation, worker’s compensation, social security, supplemental 
security, public assistance, veteran’s benefits, survivor’s income, disability income, retirement income, in-
come from interest, dividends, and rents, educational assistance, child support, alimony, financial assis-
tance payments, the earned income tax credit, and other income, from which federal and state income tax, 
FICA, federal retirement, and property taxes were subtracted. See also 
http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/sumincvar.htm (downloaded April 5, 2007). The Family Survey 
Dutch Population consists of the following income components: wage and salary work including bonuses, 
self-employed income, unemployment compensation, social security, disability income, (early) retirement 
income, old age pension, income from interest and dividend, alimony, study grants, allowance from 
parents. It are net amounts. Household income is the sum of net income of both spouses. 
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size. Finally, we made incomes comparable between the two countries by re-expressing them in 
purchase power parities in 2000 US dollars (Firebaugh 1999). Conversion factors have been de-
rived from the OECD (2000-euro = .925 2000-US dollar (http://www.oecd.org). For the Dutch 
LIS/SEP data, first a conversion into euros (1 euro = 2.20371 guilders) and into 2000 consumer 
prices (1999-euro = .974 2000-euro, Statistics Netherlands, statline.cbs.nl) was required. For the 
Family Survey Dutch Population 2000 only a conversion from guilders into euros was needed 
before applying the PPP conversion.  
 
A central issue for our analysis is whether individuals who work less than full-time do so 
voluntarily. For the United States, this information is available in the 1998 General Social Survey. 
For the Netherlands, we used the OSA Labour Supply Panel data of 2002 collected by the Insti-
tute for Labour Studies. Both sources contain the question of whether one prefers to work more, 
fewer or the same number of hours a week, given that the wage rate remains the same. The dis-
tribution of preferences for work hours differs strongly between the United States and the Neth-
erlands. According to Table 4, three-quarters of Dutch employees are satisfied with their present 
working hours and related income situation, whereas the proportion of Americans who would 
not want to change their work hours is only 57 percent. The proportion that prefers fewer hours 
is higher among the Dutch than among the Americans, and more Americans than Dutch prefer 
to increase their hours and income (panel A). American and Dutch part-time working women 
are more satisfied with their work schedules than their full-time working counterparts. In con-
trast, many part-time American men are not satisfied and want to work more (panel B). Because 
the proportion of part-time workers is larger in the Netherlands than in the United States and 
because more Dutch than Americans are satisfied, the size of the group of satisfied part-timers is 
much larger in the Netherlands. One-third of the Dutch work force consists of part-time workers 
who do not want to change their work hours, while only 9 percent of American workers fall into 
this category (panel C).  
 
We used the information from the OSA Labour Supply Panel data of 2002 to adjust the in-
comes reported in the Dutch SEP and the Family Survey Dutch Population. Using the OSA data, 
we assigned full-time earnings to all part-time workers who expressed a preference for the same 
or fewer working hours and then computed the percentage difference between original and ad-
justed income for all twenty quantiles of the Dutch income distribution. When adjusting the in-
comes of satisfied part-time workers to full-time incomes, we calculated full-time income as the 
observed wage rate times 39 hours for both the Netherlands and the U.S. (the average number of 
working hours for Dutch full-timers is thirty-nine hours, while the average in the U.S. is forty-
six hours). We then applied these quantile adjustments to the Dutch 1999 LIS/SEP data and also 
to the 2000 Family Survey Dutch Population. For the American case, we used the 1998 General 
Social Survey, which contains a question about whether one would prefer to work more and 
earn more, work the same and earn the same, or work less and earn less. The adjustment meas-
ure is constructed similarly as for the Netherlands, and the result was then used to adjust quan-
tiles of the income distribution as calculated with the 2000 CPS.7  
                                                 
7Respondents were asked to indicate which of the twenty-three categories, ranging from less than 1,000 
dollars to over 110,000 dollars, reflected their personal net income. We randomly assigned an income to 
each respondent within the ranges from the category to which he or she belongs. For example, if a respon-
dent indicated earning between $20,000 and $22,499 a year, this respondent has been assigned an income 
that is randomly selected from all incomes between $20,000 and $22,499. The median income lies between 
  12 Table 4: Satisfaction with Working Hours in the Netherlands and the U.S. (percentages) 
 
Panel A: Preference for working hours (if wage remains 
the same) 
        
 total  men  women 
 NL  U.S.  NL  U.S. NL U.S. 
More 7  32  4  38 10  28 
Same 75  57  76  55 74  59 
Less 19  10  21  8 16  13 
 100  100  100  100 100  100 
 
Panel B: Preference for working hours by working hours 
 total  men  women 
  NL U.S.  NL U.S.  NL U.S. 
  part full part full part full  part  full  part  full  part  full 
More 12  2 35  32 13  2  62  36  12  2  26  28 
Same 77  73 56  57 75  76  29  57  77  64  65  58 
Less  11 24  9 11  13 22  10  8  11  35  9  14 
  100  100 100  100 100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
Panel C: distribution of preferred and current working 
hours 
         
 total  men  women 
 NL  U.S.  NL  U.S. NL U.S. 
Part-time: more  5  5  1  5 9  6 
Part-time: same  33  9  9  2 60  15 
Part-time: less  5  1  1  1 8  2 
Full-time: more  1  27  2  33 0 22 
Full-time: same  42  48  67  52 14  45 
Full-time: less  14  9  19  7 8 11 
 100  100  100  100 100  100 
Source: General Social Survey 1998 (U.S.) and OSA 2002 (The Netherlands), only working population be-
tween ages twenty-five and fifty-five; for Netherlands, self-employed are excluded; part-time has been de-
fined as less than thirty-five hours, full-time as thirty-five hours or more. 
 
These adjustments can only be an approximation of the true value of the non-worked 
hours of satisfied part-time workers. This value, which in economics is commonly referred to as 
the reservation wage, is heterogeneous in the population. Figure 3 shows the result for a hypo-
thetical portion of the income distribution, which we define as those with identical household 
incomes, identical part-time wages, and an identical number of work hours. For simplicity, we 
show the distribution as a normal distribution which is truncated at €12, which in this figure 
represents the per hour average net increment in disposable income that would be obtained by 
working full-time instead of part-time for satisfied part-timers. Because these part-timers are sat-
                                                                                                                                                              
$25,000 and $30,000. That is why we set the minimum income of the lowest category to $250 (that is 1 per-
cent of the median) and the maximum income of the highest category to $250,000 (that is ten times the 
median). We repeated the procedure of random assignment ten times, and considered the mean income of 
these ten rounds to be the original income. We applied these adjustments to the 2000 CPS data as they are 
contained in the LIS. 
 
  13 isfied, the value distribution is truncated on the left; if any of the voluntary part-timers assigned 
a lower value to non-work time, they would by definition be working instead.  
 
Because the tax systems of both countries are progressive, our approximation is above 
the lower-bound of its value for this population. However, we still conclude that our estimate is 
conservative, in the sense that it is below the mean value for this subpopulation. Note that even if 
the distribution is symmetrical, the left truncation creates a right skew and pushes the mean 
above the median. For our measure to be too high, it would have to be true that a flattening of 
the tax system (such that the hourly take home pay on the non-worked hours by satisfied part-
time workers would equal the hourly take home pay on the worked hours) would all by itself 
draw more than 50 percent of the satisfied part-timers into the full-time labor market. The Neth-
erlands has a large fraction of women working part-time throughout the income distribution, 
and notably also in the bottom third of the income distribution, where the Dutch income tax was 
relatively flat in the period covered by our data. This fact suggests that the labor supply re-
sponse to a flat tax would not be as large as 50 percent, and therefore our adjustment for part-
time work is conservative. 
 
Further evidence that our assigned value is conservative comes from considerations of 
the wage elasticity of supply. Goldin (1990) reported a range of estimated wage elasticities of 
supply for American women from various studies as between 0.4 and 0.8 for the 1950-1980 pe-
riod. Van Soest et al. (1990) estimated a wage elasticity of supply for Dutch women of 0.66. Our 
data show that the average Dutch female part-time worker works about twenty hours per week. 
If 50 percent of these workers became full-time workers, this would raise their average work 
hours to thirty. The wage elasticity of supply is defined as 
 
  // LL ww η Δ =Δ  
 
where L is labor supply and w is the net (after tax) wage. If  / L L Δ  is 0.5 (a 50 percent increase), 
then   must equal 0.5/0.66, which equals .76, a 76% increase. So let W be the gross wage, 
let   be the existing “high” tax rate and   be a new “low” tax rate that would cause the average 
net wage for the additional hours worked to equal the average net wage on the actual hours 
worked. Since the net wage from the flat tax must be 1.76 of the net wage from the existing tax 
rate, it follows that  
/ ww Δ
1 r 2 r
 
       21 (1 ) 1.76(1 ) rW rW − =−  
 
And so 
  21 1.76 .76 rr = −  
 
This implies a reduction in the marginal tax rate from 40 percent to 0 percent , or from 50 percent 
to 12.5 percent , or from 60 percent to 30 percent . These steps are considerably larger than the 
typical step-ups in the Dutch tax across the quantiles of the Dutch income distribution. It fol-
lows, therefore, that our estimates of the average monetary value of non-work time for Dutch 
satisfied part-time workers across the income quantiles are conservative estimates of their actual 
value. 
 
We have no data that show the proportion of workers in the Netherlands and the U.S. 
who would voluntarily give up their vacations for more paid work hours. However, we can il-
  14 lustrate the maximum potential impact of the cross-national difference in well-being in the two 
countries by assuming that all of the vacation time in both countries is preferred over work, and 
by valuing the vacation time in both countries as equal to the length of the vacation multiplied 
by each person’s wage. According to the OECD (2004) (see also Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 
2005), the average length of holidays and vacation time in the Netherlands for full-year equi-
valent workers is 7.6 weeks a year, while in the United States the average is 3.9 weeks a year for 
full-year household heads. Using the Dutch LIS/SEP data and the CPS data, we computed the 
number of weeks worked per year for workers located in each 5 percent quantile of both the 
Dutch and the U.S. household income distribution. We assumed that the average length of vaca-
tions and holidays in each quantile was the country average multiplied by the ratio of the aver-
age weeks worked in that income quantile divided by 52. We then assumed that the monetary 
value of this vacation and holiday time equaled the number of weeks of vacation multiplied by 
that person’s wage, and we added this quantity to the household income of each person. The 
percentage difference per 5 percent quantile between the original unadjusted household income 
and the household income adjusted for voluntary part-time work and vacation time is the ad-
justment measure we applied to the top and bottom coded, size-adjusted and PPP adjusted equi-
valent household income for the U.S. and the Netherlands. This valuation makes similar as-
sumptions as was earlier discussed in the part-time adjustment and has the same offsetting 
biases; on the one hand, people would get less money for the additional work because of the 
progressive tax system, but on the other hand, their valuation of vacation time may be higher 
than the foregone earnings even under a flat tax.  
 
Results: well-being adjusted for satisfaction with working hours and vacation time 
 
Table 5 shows the average incomes per 5 percent quantile before and after adjustment, 
while Figure 4 compares the ranked household size-adjusted disposable income distributions of 
the Netherlands and the U.S.. The cross-over point (the point at which Americans are better off 
than their Dutch equivalents on ranked income) is between the twentieth and twenty-fifth per-
centile when the CPS is compared with the Family Survey and is between the thirty-fifth and for-
tieth percentile when the CPS is compared with the Dutch LIS/SEP data. The income advantage in 
the American distribution remains fairly small through the bottom half of the distribution, but 
above that point, the American advantage is marked and becomes very large above the eightieth 
percentile. Table 5 shows that the mean income in the Family Survey is only 74 percent of the 
mean CPS income, while the mean Dutch LIS/SEP income is only 76 percent of the mean CPS in-
come. 
 
  Figure 5 then takes account of the value of non-work time of satisfied part-time workers 
in the two countries. Naturally, the adjusted income lines lie above the original income lines for 
both countries, because we have monetarized the value of non-work time for satisfied part-time 
workers. However, because a greater portion of Dutch workers are satisfied to work less than 
full time than is true in the U.S., the adjustment is larger in the Netherlands. As a consequence of 
this adjustment, the Dutch mean incomes have risen to 78 percent and 80 percent of the mean 
CPS income for the Family Survey and the Dutch LIS/SEP, respectively. The cross-over point for 
the CPS and the Family Survey has not changed, but the cross-over point for the CPS and the 
Dutch LIS/SEP has moved to between 45 and 50 percent, which means that nearly half the Dutch 
households – specifically those in the lower half of the income distribution – are better off than 
their American counterparts. Furthermore, the income gap between American and Dutch house-
  15 holds in the upper half of the distribution has also noticeably shrank, although the American 
households are still clearly better off. 
 
Table 5: Household Incomes Before Adjustment, After Satisfied Part-Time 
Adjustment, After Satisfied Part-Time and Vacation Adjustment 
  Before Adjustments  After Satisfied Part-Time 
Adjustment 
After Satisfied Part-Time and 
Vacation Adjustment 
 
 
U.S. 
CPS* 
NL 
LIS/ 
SEP** 
NL 
FNB+ 
U.S. 
CPS 
NL 
LIS/SEP 
NL 
FNB 
U.S. 
CPS 
NL 
LIS/SEP 
NL 
FNB 
5  2200 6465 6886 2250  6877  7325  2434  8247 8785 
10 6647  10 175 9028 7094  10 808  9590  7503  12 397 11 000 
15 8776  12 129 9790 9198  12 966  10 466  9775  14 755 11 910 
20 10 626 13 413 10 641 10 986  14 345  11 380  11 474  16 085 12 760 
25 12 373 14 405 11 596 12 787  15 112  12 165  13 538  17 068 13 740 
30 14 054 15 407 12 685 14 281  16 372  13 479  15 222  18 300 15 067 
35 15 819 16 493 13 908 15 864  17 530  14 783  16 514  19 385 16 346 
40 17 577 17 487 15 013 17 656  18 385  15 783  18 704  20 539 17 633 
45 19 415 18 340 15 820 19 474  19 447  16 775  20 448  21 534 18 575 
50 21 261 19 204 16 804 21 485  20 842  18 237  22 384  22 915 20 051 
55 23 237 20 165 17 334 23 285  22 167  19 055  24 466  24 255 20 850 
60 25 276 21 213 18 163 25 479  23 139  19 812  26 878  25 265 21 632 
65 27 490 22 161 19 849 27 997  24 051  21 542  28 953  26 112 23 388 
70 29 893 23 297 21 564 30 050  25 699  23 787  31 589  27 831 25 761 
75 32 544 24 475 23 117 33 288  26 449  24 981  34 372  28 585 26 998 
80 35 625 25 850 25 367 35 813  28 163  27 636  37 302  30 423 29 855 
85 39 497 27 720 27 402 40 212  30 244  29 897  41 665  33 025 32 647 
90 44 998 29 934 31 027 46 270  31 316  32 460  47 820  34 533 35 794 
95 53 986 33 113 37 152 56 480  35 289  39 593  58 350  38 101 42 748 
100 83 614 45 875 61 084 84 650  49 746  66 239  86 878  52 778 70 276 
Avg. 27 320 20 865 20 310 27 827  22 311  21 717  28 927  24 301 23 654 
  1.00 0.76 0.74 1.00  0.80  0.78  1.00  0.84 0.82 
* U.S. March CPS 2000.  **Dutch LIS/SEP 1999.   +Family Survey Dutch Population 2000 
Top and bottom coded, size-adjusted equivalent disposable household income in 2000 $U.S. 
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Figure 6 shows the consequence of combining the adjustment for the monetary value of 
non-working time for satisfied part-time workers with the monetary value of vacations and holi-
days. The vacation adjustment obviously increased equivalent household income in both coun-
tries, because now each household gained the monetary value of vacation time as well as the 
monetary value of the difference between part-time and full-time hours per year for satisfied 
part-time workers. Because Dutch workers take longer vacations, this adjustment was larger in 
the Netherlands than in the United States. Whereas the cross-over point using the Family Survey 
data was previously between the twentieth and twenty-fifth percentile, the addition of the value 
of vacations pushes the cross-over point to between the thirty-fifth and fortieth percentile. When 
the CPS is compared with the Dutch LIS/SEP, the Dutch situation is still more favorable, as the 
cross-over point rises to between the fiftieth and the fifty-fifth percentile. The income lines of the 
two countries now track each other quite closely until about the seventieth percentile, at which 
point they diverge. Furthermore, the mean adjusted income in the two Dutch surveys rises to 82 
percent and 84 percent of the mean American value; in other words, the two adjustments equal 
roughly one-third of the overall difference between the mean household income in the Nether-
lands and the U.S. Even though average well-being remains higher in the U.S., a substantial frac-
tion of the Dutch population or even a majority (depending on the dataset) achieves a higher 
level of well-being than their American counterparts when country differences in the use of time 
are brought into the calculation. 
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Discussion 
 
The stratification consequences of the welfare state has been a central concern of compar-
ative research for decades. The extent of inequality reduction was one of the three factors consid-
ered by Esping-Andersen (1990) in his assignment of countries to categories within his well-
known typology. However, his approach addresses only a limited aspect of the broader question 
of how national institutions shape both the level and distribution of a country’s quality of life. It 
is limited both by an overemphasis on income and by a failure to address cross-national com-
parisons of well-being, which depend on country averages and within country-inequality as 
well as realistic measures of well being that can be applied across countries. To limit attention to 
within-country inequality makes the problem easier, but it is ultimately unsatisfying.  
 
A complete accounting of cross-national differences in well-being is probably beyond the 
scope of empirical research, and only partly because of the sheer complexity of the task. A more 
fundamental theoretical problem is that people do not share the same preferences for life style 
even within countries and even within relatively homogenous subgroups of national popula-
tions. This limitation notwithstanding, we can go much further in the study of comparative wel-
fare than is currently achieved in the literature, because many dimensions of modern life can be 
ranked at least as consistent with “western values,” if not with the preferences of each and every 
member of society. Thus, just as we generally allow that more income is better than less income, 
we also treat education and health as what economists would call “normal goods.” When the na-
tional welfare system provides in-kind services, the task for social science is to formulate meth-
ods for assessing their value to the population, which involves the assessment of the quality of 
the provided service and the inequality in its provision, so that the value of the service can be 
“added” to income measures in order to provide a more complete accounting of well-being. The 
difficulty of solving this problem has yielded the default solution of omitting qualitative aspects 
of well-being that are of tremendous importance to the daily life of people and that vary system-
atically with different “varieties of capitalism” and different welfare states.  
 
There are a couple of reasons why this task has not proceeded very far as of now. One 
reason is the inherent difficulty in assessing and “pricing” qualitative services such as health 
care or education. Some of the problem also arises from fragmentation within social science. Re-
search since the 1980s on “new social movements” identified issues such as the environment 
  18 which clearly affect the national quality of life and which are distributed across the population 
in unequal amounts. Indeed, the growing research on communities identifies a host of quality of 
life issues such as crime, pollution, congestion, access to social services, quality of transportation, 
and various forms of “social disorganization.” The “social exclusion” literature similarly iden-
tifies a class of inequality-related metrics such as unemployment or child poverty, and cross-
national research routinely makes comparisons across countries on these metrics. The use of so 
many metrics for portraying the many aspects of social welfare and social inequality from one 
perspective is just an acknowledgment of the multidimensional character of social life. However, 
the literature has generally failed to establish the impact of these various dimensions on national 
well-being, on inequality in well-being, or on comparisons of well-being across countries. The 
literature is also far from measuring the tradeoffs between income and those aspects of life qual-
ity that are not readily reducible to market transactions. 
 
In this paper, we have privileged the issue of time use. This choice is justified on several 
grounds. The most obvious justification is the large difference in hours worked between Ameri-
cans and many Europeans and the obvious impact of this difference on measures of GDP per cap-
ita. Time is also more readily monetarized than are many important contributors to life quality 
such as health care or education. The third reason is the irony inherent in the asymmetric treat-
ment of goods and time in standard comparisons of national well-being that are based on in-
come.  
 
In 1943, the psychologist Abraham Maslov asserted that humans possessed a “hierarchy 
of needs,” that higher needs were not activated until lower-order needs were satisfied, and that 
what he termed the highest need, the need for “self-actualization” was often not accomplished 
through work. Its satisfaction, in fact, often required the forgoing of income for “leisure” which 
would allow cultural and artistic pursuits. This presumption that “self-actualization” was often 
best obtained outside of work – which is enshrined in economics in the Slutzky decomposition 
that posits offsetting “income” and “substitution” effects on leisure as a consequence of rising 
wages – led to the prediction that average hours of work would diminish as societies became 
wealthier. This prediction was borne out in western Europe, though not in the U.S., or at least 
not during the “prime” working years. During these years, which coincide with the normal time 
in the life course when adults raise children, the complaint in the U.S. has been less about inade-
quate time for “self-actualization” than about work-family conflict, which is felt most keenly by 
women with or without partner present who have children in the home (OECD 2004; see also 
Bianchi et al. 2006). A considerable body of research has established that high levels of work 
hours and working separate shifts (which is related to the level of hours of work) are associated 
with marital problems for both men and women, which obviously has a negative impact on 
overall quality of life (Presser 2000; Crouter, Bumpass, Head, and McHale 2001; Gager and San-
chez 2003; Poortman 2005). 
 
  Our comparison focused only on part of the difference in working hours between the 
U.S. and the Netherlands, namely that portion which involves the different distribution of part-
time workers in the ages twenty-five to fifty-five between the two countries. Our adjustment 
measure could have been extended further to consider the category of satisfied non-workers (in-
cluding early retirees), which, like part-time work, is a product of a country’s market and 
welfare-state characteristics. Involuntary non-employment is likely to be higher in more gener-
ous welfare states because of the higher tax wedge (which varies with the particular method by 
which social welfare benefits are financed), but at the same time voluntary non-work is likely to 
  19 be higher in welfare states because higher social benefits give people the choice of not working 
without suffering severe financial hardship. The practical difficulty of adjusting the income of 
satisfied non-workers is that the wage rate of these non-workers is not readily observable. By 
limiting our adjustments for satisfied non-work only to those who were in the labor force, we 
provided a conservative assessment of the impact of different distributions of working time on 
the comparison of Dutch and American quality of life. 
 
Our study focused only on two countries. However, the qualitative result of our study 
would probably be similar had we used France, Germany, the United Kingdom or Norway, all 
of which have considerably higher levels of female part-time work than does the United States 
(OECD 2005). Welfare states seem better capable of offering their population the number of work-
ing hours they wish because they protect their populations against economic privation. People 
who would not be happy in a full-time job because their health is not good or because they do 
not like to make heavy use of child care have the opportunity to choose to work fewer hours 
without encountering severe financial hardship. The case of Israel, in contrast, is arguably an ex-
ception that at least supports the rule. In Israel, the preferences of women have been shifting 
from part-time to full-time work, and this shift may have been driven at least partially by a re-
duction in welfare-state benefits (Cohen and Stier 2006). If we take this characteristic of welfare 
states into account when comparing living standards across countries, our tentative conclusion 
is that the aggregate gains in quality of life from working reduced hours offset at least a portion 
of the income gap between European welfare states and the United States. 
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Appendix A: Working hours in the Netherlands: choice or constraint?    
 
Satisfaction with working hours  N % 
I want to work the same number of hours as I do now  1887  74.9 
I want to work more hours  148  5.9 
I want to work fewer hours  484  19.2 
 
  I want to work more hours  I want to work fewer 
hours 
Do you think you can realize your preferences 
within one year? 
N % N  % 
Yes 73  50.3  131 27.3 
No 49  33.8  300  62.5 
Don’t know  23  15.9  49 10.2 
         
Why do you think you will not be able to realize 
your preferences (more answers possible) 
       
My employer does not like this change  19  38.9  106 35.0 
My job does not allow this change  5  10.6  141  47.1 
Because of care for children  10  19.4  10 3.2 
Because of health  4  8.1  3 0.9 
Source: OSA 2002, employed population aged 25-55       
 
 